CONTRACTS IN RESTRAINT
corporation, or complain of a
wrong, so long as its regular authorities are acting honestly within
the discretionary powers which
have been entrusted to them."
In Dudley v. Kentucky High
School, 9 Bush, 578, the Court
said: "Each and every stockholder
contracts that the will of the
majority shall govern in all matters coming within the limits of
the act of incorporation; and in
cases involving no breach of trust,
but only error or mistake of judg-
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ment on the part of the directors
who represent the company, individual stockholders have no right
to appeal to the courts to decide.
the line of policy to be pursued by
the corporation."
See also Lord v. Copper Miners'
Co., 2 Phill., 751; Treadwell v.
Salisbury Mauf. Co., 7 Gray, 393;
Durfee v. Old Colony etc., R. R.
Co., 5 Allen, 231; Farieria v. Riter,
iS Phila., 58; and Sprague'v. Illinois River R. R. Co., 19 Ill., 174.
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Contractsin Restraint of Trade-Common Carriers.
An agreeshent between fifteen railway companies, extending through
eighteen States and Territories west of the Missouri River, for the purpose of mutual protection, whereby a committee formed of representatives from each of the contracting roads should be appointed to establish
rates, rules and regulations on the traffic subject to said association, and
to consider changes therein and make rules for meeting the competition
of outside lines, is not an agreement, combination or conspiracy in
restraint of trade in violation of the Act of July 2, 389o, 1.
Nor is such an agreement in violation of P 2 of such Act as tending
to the monopolization of trade and commerce.
It was not the intention of Congress to include common carriers
subject to the Interstate Commerce Act of February 4, 1887, within the
provisions of the Act of July 2, i89o, which is a special statute relating
to combinations in the form of trusts and conspiracies in restraint of
trade.
1

Reported in 53 Fed. Rep., 440, IS92.
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OPINION OF THE COURT.

RIMER, J.:

The rule of law which recognizes tile rights of
the public to have the benefit of fair and healthy competition, and to require that equal facilities and reasonable
rates shall be secured to all, does not condemn a contract
between railway companies operating competing lines,
.which is made for the sole purpose of preventing strife and
preventing financial ruin to one or the other, so long as the
purpose and effect of such an agreement is not to deprive
the public of its right to have adequate facilities and fixed
and reasonable prices. On the contrary, such agreements,
instead of being obnoxious to the law, because detrimental
to the public interest, are to be upheld for the reason that
they benefit the public by preventing unjust discrimination
among shippers and providing equal facilities for the interchange of traffic, and thus avoiding many of the unfair and
unjust results which often follow the unrestricted competition of rival companies.
one, while the test to be applied
In the case stated an injunction
varies in different courts. The
was prayed by the attorney general
general*rule is that contracts in
under the Anti-trust Act of July 2,
189o, 26 Stat at Lg., 209 ; ,but the restraint of trade, if partial and
reasonable, are not void, but the
attempt to extend the act to traffic
practical difficulty is to determine
arrangements between common
carriers failed on two grounds: One -what restraint is reasonable. And
that such agreements are not com- this is where the courts divide,
some being influenced by the actual
binations in restraint of trade, and
effect of the agreement, others, and
the other that common carriers
subject to the conditions of the Act
these the great majority,, by the
of February 4, 1887, are not gov- supposed injurious tendency. The
erned by the later statute of 189o. following cases, taken up in the
order of citation by the court in the
An examination of the cases on
which the learned judge'bases his principal case, show this difference
decision may not be unprofitable in
in opinion:
aiding us to decide whether a new
The first case cited is Commondeparture has been taken in this wealth v. Carlisle, Brightly N. P.,
department of the law or not.
36 (1821), which came before the
The question as to the legality or
court on a writ of habeas corpus
after a commitment on the charge
illegality of contracts in so-called
of conspiracy.
The defendants
restraint of trade is a much mooted
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were arrested for forming a combination among the master shoemakers to employ no one save
those who would accept a certain
reduction in wages. It appeared
that the employees had previously
compelled a rise in wages by a
similar combination among themselves. GIBSON, C. J., released the
defendants on bail, holding that
the case was one for a jury, as the
motive for combining or the nature
of the object to be attained were
the discriminating circumstances
in such cases. People v. Fisher,
14 Wend., 9, was the case of an
indictment against certain journeymen shoemakers for conspiring to
raise the prices for making shoes,
and to compel their fellow-workmen to accept such wages and
none lower. It 'was held to be a
combination.with an object injurious to the public. In the next case
ater, 4
cited, Hooker v. Vandew%
Denio, five canal companies agreed
to establish rates of freight and
passage to govern the association.
The object was declared in the
agreement to be "to establish and
maIntain fair and uniform rates of
freight and to equalize the business
of forwarding on the Erie and
Oswego .Canal among themselves,
and to avoid all unnecessary expenses in doing the same." The
Court, however, held: "To destroy
rivalry and keep up the prices to
certain rates was the great object of
The transaction
the agreement.
amounted as I think, to a conspiracy to commit an act injurious
to trade."
. In Stanton v. Allen, 5 Denio,
434, there was an agreement by
thirty-five canal companies with
the avowed purpose of "establishing fair and uniform rates of
freight," whereby the earnings of
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the companies were virtually
pooled. The action arose on a
promissory note given in pursuance
of the agreement. The Court held
the contract void, as injury to the
public must be the inevitable result
in poorer service and higher rates.
Note that it did not appear that
such had actually been the result,
but the judge draws this picture of
inevitable injury by a process.of
deduction.
Morris Run Coal Co. v. Barclay
Coal Co., 68 Pa., 173, arose on an
agreement entered into by five coal
companies to divide two coal regions of which they had the control. A committee was to be appointed to decide all matters* of
importance, to fix prices and to
appoint a general agent to whom
all the coal mined was to be delivered, and who-was to have power to
suspend shipments by any company
beyond its proportion. The Court
held the agreemeni illegal as in
restraint of trade, as also forbidden
by a New York statute which forbids "persons to conspire to commit any act injurious to trade or
commerce." Craft v. McConoughy,
79 Ill., 346, was an action for division of profit under an agreement
made by four local grain dealers.
Profits were to be pooled and prices
fixed by a committee. The combination controlled all the warehouses in the city, though its
organization was kept a secret.
There were no proofs that the rates
had been unreasonably raised. The
Court held, however, that the contract was void as injurious and
oppressive to the public. In Salt
Co. v. Guthrie, 35 Ohio, 666, an
agreement was called in question
by which an association had been
formed by certain dealers in a saltproducing district of Ohio. A
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committee was to regulate price
and grade and control th'e time of
receiving the product from the
members, none ofwhom were'to sell
at their own factories save at retail.
It was in evidence that the association did not include all the dealers
in the district, and that its salt was
placed in competition with the product of outside dealers. The Court
neverthelegs held the contract void,
as the tendency of such contracts
is to destroy competition.
The learned judge next cites
Texas R. R. v. Southern Pacific,
6 So. Rep., 888, where specific performance was sought of an agreement to pool the traffic of the two
roads and not to discriminate
against each other. But the Court
refused to grant the petition, saying: "'We have been at great pains
to examine all the authorities,
and we reach the con..
clusion that American' jurispru.dence has firmly settled the doctrine that all contracts which have
a palpable tendency to stifle competition, either in the market value
of commodities or in the carriage
or transportation of such commodities, are contrary to public policy
and are therefore incapable of conferring upon the parties thereto
any rights which a court ofjustice
can recognize or enforce." In Anderson v. Jett, 12 S. W. Rep., 670
(Kt. App. Ct.), specific performance was sought for an agreement
between the owners of two competitive steamboats to divide the
net earnings. Prayer was refused.
Gibbs v. Gas Co., 130 U. S., 396,
was an action brought on an agreement to pay for services in forming
a pool of the gas companies of the
city of Baltimore. The contract
was held to be illegal and recovery
refused, the Courtsaying: "Courts
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decline to enforce contracts which
impose a restraint, though only
partial, upon a business of such
character that restraint to any extent will be prejudicial to the public; but where the public welfare is
not involved, and the restraintupon
one party is not greater than protection to the other party requires, a
contract in restraint of trade may be
sustained." From this statement
of Chief Justice FuLLuR, Judge
RINER comes to the conclusion in
the principal case, that the question whether or not the contract is
prejudicial to the public interest is
the test to be applied. But it will
be seen that in this as well as in
the previous cases cited certain
business of a quasi public nature,
including common carriers, had
been set down as of such a character that restraint, though only partial, would be prejudicial to the
public interest. And though the
learned judge is.right in saying
that the question whether the restraint is prejudicial to the public
interest is the test, yet the decisions had gone :further and held
that any restraint in the natuse of
a pool or an arrangement by common carriers to fix rates was prejudicial to the public interest, so
that he might have decided the
case here without going further.
The Court, however, now turns to
certain cases where restraints have
been deemed reasonable.' But it is
noticeable that in every instance
the restraint was upon the use of a
patent right or secret process, or
else it was to insure the whole of
the good will of the business, while
there is not one case of combination by common carriers to refute
the four adverse decisions already
quoted.
In Roller Co. v. Cushman, 143
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Mass., 353, three manufacturers of
patent roller shades entered into
an agreement to fix prices and divide profits for three years. The
agreement was held valid, as it did
not look to affecting competition
from without, as the parties had a
monopoly by their patent. Also,
Gloucester Glue Co. v. Cement
Co., 154 Mass., 92. In Davis v.
Mason, 5 Tenn. R., 120, a partial
restraint put .upon a surgeon on
the sale of his practice was held
valid. To same effect is Homer v.
Ashford, 3 Bing., 322. In Cloth
Co. v. Lorsout, L. R., 9 Eq., 345,
there is a very strong opinion as
to the validity of contracts in restraint of trade, and a contract restraining one from selling anywhere within the kingdom was
held valid; but'here, again, it was
a patent process for making oilcloth that was sold. Where a
dealer in drive-wells sold his stock
in trade and covenanted not to engage in the business of making
drive-wells, it was held, he could
be restrained from entering the
business within a reasonable radius
of his former store. But this was
clearly in the nature of a sale of
the good-will: Hubbard v. Miller,
27 Mich., 15. Again, where the
restriction covered the whole of
the United States, yet was only coextensive with the business, it was
held reasonable for the protection
of the purchaser: Thermometer v.
Pool, 51 Hun., 157.
In Diamond Match Co. v. Roeber,
io6 N. Y., 473, the defendant had
sold his stock, trade-mark and
good-will, and covenanted with
plaintiff not to engage in the match
business within any of the United
States, save Nevada and Montana.
The plaintiff was a syndicate engaged in buying up all the match
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factories in the country, and now
sued to enjoin the defendant from
breaking his covenant. The court
held in a very able opinion that
the common law doctrine that contracts in general restraint of trade
are void without regard to circumstances, has been much weakened
and modified, and enjoined the defendant from breaking his covenant. In reply to the argument,
urged by the defendant, that the
purpose of the plaintiff was to
crush competition, the Court said:
"We are not aware of any rule of
law which makes the motive of the
covenantee the test of the validity
of such a contract. On the contrary, we suppose a party may lkgally purchase the trade and business of another for the very purpose of preventing competition,
and the validity of the contract, if
supported by a consideration, will
depend upon its reasonableness as
between the parties."
And the
Court comes to the opinion, "that
the covenant, being supported by a
good consideration and constituting a partial and not a general restraint, and being in view of the
circumstances disclosed reasonable,
is valid and not void." It is a remarkable fact that in Richardson
v. Buhl, 43 N. W. Rep., 1102, the
Supreme Conrt of Michigan decided that a contract by this same'
syndicate, identical with the one
in the above case, was unreasonable and void. SHERWOOD, Chief
Justice, said: "It is difficult to
conceive of a ifionopoly which can
affect a greater number of people
or one more extensivd in its effect
on the country, than that of the
Diamond Match Company."
In
the next case cited, where the purchaser of a steamer which had
been used in California cove-
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nanted not to employ it within
ten years of date of sale on Californian waters, the United States
Supreme Court held the agreement
valid, and not against public policy:
'Navigation Co. v. Winsor, 2oWall.,
64.
On sale of a printing establishment a restriction on the vendor
not to engage in the business
within the State was held valid,
and the vendor was compelled to
live up to it. Judge CnRISTIANcY,
in a masterly opinion, showed that
"the public is quite. as much interested in the prosperity of its
citizens in their various avocations
as it can possibly be in their competition. The latter may bring low
prices to purchasers, but may also
bring them so low that capital becomes unprofitable, and business
men. fail to the general injury of
the community: " Beal v. Chase,
31 Mich., 52J.
From the above cases the court
conies to the conclusion as stated
in the part of the opinion quoted
at the head of this article, that
cases must be judged according to
their circumstances, and that such
a contract between common carriers is valid, and is not an agreement, combination or conspiracy
in restraint of trade in violation
.of the first section of the Act of
July 2, I89o. The Court, speaking
through Judge RINBR, says: "My
own view is that the contention of
counsel is altogether too broad.
The public is not entitled to free
and unrestricted competition, but
what it is entitled to is fair and
healthy competition; and I see
nothing in this contract which
necessarily tends to interfere with
that right." He then goes on to
show that there is a large field left
for competition in the manner and

quickness of service, general facilities, etc., and that the fixing of
rates was but a small infringement
on the freedom of trade.
The point of view of the court in
this case is particularly interesting.
In Cleveland R. R. v. Closser, 126
Ind., 348, it was said: "It is, however, both appropriate and necessary to adjudge that a combination
between common carriers to prevent competition is at least prima
face illegal."
And again: "If
such a contract can stand, it must
be upon an affirmative showing,
and one so full, complete and clear
as to remove the presumption that
it was formed to do mischief to the
public by repressing fair competition." From this. it appears that
the courts have looked with anything but a friendly eye upon such
combinations in the past. But in
the principal case the contract is
construed in the most liberal manner, and is by no means treated as.
prima facie illegal. It is true the
case before us was heard oix bill
and answer, and, therefore, all allegations of fact in the anwer were
admitted to be true. But never
before, I think, in a case of this
kind has a court taken the reil object of the agreement to be the
same as the nominal one stated
therein. The object here, as stated,
was the establishment of just and
reasonable charges, and in accordance with this it was affi'rmed in
the answer that the public had
been benefited by the establishment of'such just and reasonable
rates. The Court says in effect, as
long as your charges are reasonable your combination is all right.
While in most previous cases of
combinations in trade the actual
beneficial effect on the public has
been discounted, and the object, as
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set forth in the agreement, has
been looked upon as only'a cover
to some sinister design.
In State v. Standard Oil Co., 30
N. R., 279 (Ohio Supreme Court),
which was a proceeding in the nature of quo warranto against an
Ohio corporation for joining the
Standard Oil Trust, the Court said:

"It may be true that it (the trust)
has improved the quality and
cheapened the cost of petroleum
and its products to the consumer.
But such is not one of the usual or
general results of a monopoly and
it is the policy of the law to regard
not .what may, but what usually
happens." From the facts in this
case it would appear that it was the
policy of the law, at least in Ohio,

to disregard actual facts for preconceived theories. Again in Richardson v. Buhl, supra, in regard to
the evidence that prices and rates
had been reduced by the combination of dealers, the Court said: "It
is no answer to say that this monopoly has, in fact, reduced the price
The fact
of friction matches.
exists that it rests in the discretion
of this company at any time to
raise the price to an exorbitant deIn another one of the
gree."
cases cited as -authority by Judge
RINER, Salt Co. v.Guthrie, it was
said: "It is no answer to say that
competition in the salt trade was
not, in fact, destroyed or that the
price of the commodity was iot
unreasonably advanced; courts will
not stop to inquire as to the degree
of injury inflicted upon the public;
it is enough to know that the inevitable tendency of such contracts is
injurious to the public." In Hooker
v. Vandewater, snupra, the object
expressed in the agreement was
the "establishing and maintaining
fair and uniform rates of freight
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and equalizing the businegs among
themselves, and to avoid all unnecessary expense in the same." Of
this, JiwETT, J., observed: "The
object of the agreement, as expressed in thewritten contract, was
plausible enough, but it is impossible to conceal the real intention."
He adds, "to destroy which rivalry
and keep up the price to certain
rates fixed by themselves was the
great, if not the sole, object of the
agreement." See also Stanton v.
Allen, 5 Denio, 434; People v.
North River Sugar Refining Co.,
54 Hun., 354; Texas & Pac. R. R!.
v. Southern Pacific R. R.; 6So. Rep.,
888.
Railroad Co. v. State of Texas
36 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas., 481,
though directly in point, seeins to
have been overlooked by both judge
and counsel in the principle case.
There -a bill in equity was brought
by the attorney general to restrain
several railroads from carrying out
a traffic agreement identical with
the one in the principal case, save
that the contracting roads were
fewer in number. The contract
was held illegal as contrary to the
constitution of Texas which provides that "no railroad .

.

.. or

managers of any railroad corporation, shall consolidate the st6ck,
property and franchises of such
corporations with .

. ..

or in any

way control any railroad corporation owning or having under its
control a parallel or competing
line." The case was heard on bill
and answer. The Court came to
the conclusion that "a leading object, if not the sole object of' the
association.is, by the appointment
of a comnimbn governing committee,
to fix rates of transportation so
as to prevent competion among
he several parties to the contract;"
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and it was determined that the"
carrying out of this would result in
giving such control to one road
over anotfier as is forbidden by the
constitution. The judge, however,
gives forth the dicta that it was not
quite clear to his mind "that even
in the absence of the constitutional
provission . . . . the defendant's
association could not be enjoined
as being in restraint of competition
.and contrary to public policy;"
again evidencing the unfriendly
way in which the courts have
viewed any combination in trade
to adjust pricbs and rates whether
reasonable oi; no.
Itsis certainly refreshing to find
such a broad and economic view of
a clhss of agreements which has
more often been the subject of
abuse than'of thoughtful consideration, as is elpressed by Judge
RI NR.
Surely this cry that competition is the life of trade should
become dumb in the presence of
the present stagnation of trade
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when it is becoming manifest to
the minds of all that exchange of
labor, which means exchange of
money, is the life of trade, and
that competition is but a slight element in comparison.
Such legal questions as the one
involved in the principal case can-"
not be settled ofihand by a simple
reference to some dicta laid down
in Queen Anne's time. Times and
business conditions change and a
rule which is based on public
policy must vary with the conditions of the age. Such a rule as
that against contracts in restraint
of trade caui only be rightly applied
where the court gives full force
and effect to the economic conditions and social needs of the age.
Judge RmRN has considered these
conditions and his decision, we
think, marks a step in advance in
this department of the law of contracts.
C. F. EGGLMTSTON.

